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AGAINST GENETIC
EXCEPTIONALISM: AN ARGUMENT
IN FAVOR OF THE VIABILITY OF
PRECONCEPTION GENETIC TORTS
DANIEL S. GOLDBERG*
Courts have generally grappled with the issue of prenatal torts for the last fifty
years. Prenatal torts are commonly defined as "actions involving injuries that result
from tortious acts that occurred before a plaintiffs birth."' The most well-known
instance of these torts being litigated is cases involving diethylstilbestrol (DES)
exposure. DES was a drug administered to pregnant women from 1947 to 1971 to
prevent miscarriages.3 The drug caused damage in utero to the fetuses, who later in
life developed abnormalities such as cervical cancers or malformations of the
uterus.4 DES is an example of a teratogen, which is "a chemical or physical agent
that produces or raises the incidence of congenital malformations" in utero.5
Because the effects of DES did not manifest until the plaintiffs were adult
women, these women had possibly already reproduced, producing putative
additional plaintiffs. 6 Many plaintiffs have successfully litigated DES claims, 7 and
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1. Julie A. Greenberg, Reconceptualizing Preconception Torts, 64 TENN. L. REv. 315, 316 n.1
(1997).
2. See infra notes 9-12, 79-83 and accompanying text.
3. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 322 n.55 (citing Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198, 200
(N.Y. 1991), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 868 (1991)).
4. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 322 n.55.
5. THOMAS D. GELEHRTER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL GENETICS 349 (2d ed. 1998); Robert
Mittendorf, Teratogen Update: Carcinogenesis and Teratogenesis Associated With Exposure to
Diethylstilbestrol (DES) In Utero, 51 TERATOLOGY 435 (1995).
6. However, courts have generally denied third-generation grandchildren of the original mother
who took DES recovery based on a theory of limited duty. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 322 n.55, 339-40;
see also Enright, 570 N.E.2d at 202 (holding that strict products liability of DES manufacturers would
not support a "multigenerational cause of action").
7. See, e.g., McMahon v. Eli Lilly & Co., 774 F.2d 830, 835-36 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding sufficient
evidence for a jury to reasonably conclude that Eli Lilly "knew or should have known that DES might
cause reproductive abnormalities" in 1955).
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generally, courts have not voiced concern with the prospect of multiple generations
of plaintiffs litigating in DES cases. 8 For example, in McMahon v. Eli Lilly, the
court reversed a directed verdict granted to the defendant drug manufacturer. 9 The
plaintiffs, a woman and her husband representing themselves and their deceased
son, were second- and third-generation plaintiffs in the DES-based action.' 0 The
court ruled that the plaintiff-mother was not barred from recovery either for herself
or for her child simply because she was a second-generation victim of injuries
caused by the teratogenic effects of prior exposure to DES."
There is a plethora of literature addressing prenatal torts caused by teratogens
such as DES. 12 However, a distinct, but related, issue has yet to be appropriately
handled either by the courts or by state legislatures: preconception genetic torts.
The DES claims are all based on prenatal, postconception genetic torts, where the
chromosomal breakage, if any, occurred in utero.13 Chromosomal breakage occurs
as a result of the addition or deletion of chromosomes or specific parts of
chromosomes. 14 In each human cell there are forty-six chromosomes; these
chromosomes contain the nearly three billion base pair sequences that comprise
each individual's genetic code. 15 A mutation in these chromosomes is "any
permanent heritable change in the sequence of genomic DNA."' 6 What makes
chromosomal breakage due to mutagenic effect unique is that it can occur to pre-
existing DNA.' 7 This bears special significance for females, who are born with all
of the gametes they will ever need in their lifetime, unlike males who continuously
produce gametes for most of their lives. 18 Where a particular mutagen alters or
breaks the chromosomes of the reproductive cells, including the eggs or oocytes, a
8. See infra notes 9-12 and accompanying text. But see Enright, 570 N.E.2d at 202 (citing fears of
multigenerational liability as a reason to deny relief).
9. 774 F.2d at 830, 832, 838.
10. Id. at 831.
11. Id. at 835-36.
12. E.g., Marisa L. Mascaro, Preconception Tort Liability: Recognizing a Strict Liability Cause of
Actionfor DES Grandchildren, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 435 (1991); Stephen A. Hurst, Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories: DES Cases and the Move Toward New Tort Remedies, 49 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REV. 245
(1981).
13. See Mascaro, supra note 12, at 436; Enright, 570 N.E.2d at 199; McMahon, 774 F.2d at 832.
14. GELEHRTER ET AL., supra note 5, at 3.
15. Andrew Askland, What, Me Worry? The Multi-Front Assault on Privacy, 25 ST. Louis U. PUB.
L. REV. 33, 47 (2006).
16. GELEHRTER ET AL., supra note 5, at 346.
17. A mutagen is "a chemical or physical agent that increases the mutation rate by causing changes
in DNA." Id.
18. See Katharine K. Baker, Gender, Genes, and Choice: A Comparative Look at Feminism,
Evolution, and Economics, 80 N.C. L. REV. 465, 471 (2002). A gamete is defined as a "haploid germ
cell," and a germ cell is defined as "a reproductive cell that fuses with one from the opposite sex in
fertilization to form a single-celled zygote." ROBERT C. KING & WILLIAM D. STANSFIELD, A
DICTIONARY OF GENETICS 133, 141 (5th ed. 1997).
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later-fertilized egg may possess the chromosomal alteration.' 9 This mutative
process is the phenomenon of chromosomal breakage.
In the past thirty years, courts have seen a slow rise in the number of actions
brought based entirely on preconception genetic torts-where the chromosomal
damage occurs to the mother before the child is conceived.2 ° Unlike in the DES
cases, courts have generally been unwilling to grant as much freedom to
preconception torts plaintiffs.
21 .
This article addresses the status of preconception genetic torts. Preconception
torts may be defined as "actions involving injuries that result from tortious acts that
occurred before a plaintiff's conception."2 2 A "preconception genetic tort" is the
shorthand I will use to refer to those injuries that alter the chromosomal structure of
the mother rather than cause damage to somatic cells.
23
There are a host of complicated questions that arise in the preconception
genetic tort paradigm, including: (1) Is chromosomal breakage a legally
compensable injury in and of itself, or must an attendant syndrome or condition
manifest to constitute a legally compensable injury? (2) Should the extent of the
relief be limited to injuries resulting from developments prior to conception? (3)
What relief should be granted where chromosomal breakage occurs during
preconception, but where the genetic syndrome is multifactorial and only develops
in utero? (4) Is increased risk of cancer due to a preconception mutagen a legally
compensable injury? (5) Who may sue? The mother? The child? The grandchildren
of the mother? The great-grandchildren? 24 (6) Will it be impossible to prove that
but for a defendant's negligence, a child would not have been born with
chromosomal alteration or subsequent genetic disorders? (7) Should fears of multi-
generational liability justify courts in denying preconception tort actions based on
an analysis of proximate cause? (8) Should fears of the growing relevance of an
individual's private genetic information to a personal injury action justify courts in
denying the viability of preconception genetic torts?
I will examine each of these questions in turn. Part I considers the problems
relating to the injury: when does it occur, and is it (such as increased risk of cancer
19. See GELEHRTER ET AL., supra note 5, at 163-66.
20. Matthew Browne, Preconception Tort Law in an Era of Assisted Reproduction: Applying a
Nexus Test for Duty, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2555, 2556 (2001).
21. E.g., Taylor v. Cutler, 703 A.2d 294, 295 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (declining to
recognize "preconception negligence" as a tort); Albala v. City of N.Y., 429 N.E.2d 786, 787-88 (N.Y.
1981) (denying recovery to a plaintiff child with severe brain damage resulting from negligent
perforation to the mother's uterus).
22. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 316 n.2 (citing Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 591 N.E.2d 696, 698
(Ohio 1992)).
23. A somatic cell is "any cell of an organism not involved in the germline." GELEHRTER ET AL.,
supra note 5, at 349.
24. This is known as the problem of multiple-generation liability. See infra notes 111-115 and
accompanying text.
20071
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
due to chromosomal breakage) cognizable. Part II surveys the intricate problems of
causation that attend preconception genetic torts, including the policy
considerations that animate proximate cause analyses, as well as difficulties in
adducing adequate proof of causation. Finally, Part III considers the problems of
preconception genetic torts from a broad-based, policy-oriented view, and
concludes that there is little justification for denying the viability of preconception
genetic torts, or for treating them altogether differently from preconception torts in
general. The judicial system is well-equipped to handle any of the difficulties and
problems presented by claims for preconception genetic torts. There is little policy
justification for rejecting such claims as non-cognizable.
I. THE INJURY
A. When Does the Injury Occur?
The first notable case involving preconception genetic torts was Jorgensen v.
Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc.25 In this case, a father brought an action based
on theories of negligence, strict liability, and breach of express and implied
warranties on behalf of his daughters afflicted with Down syndrome. 6 The
plaintiffs wife took birth control pills manufactured by the defendant for a period
of approximately six months.27 Nine months after she ceased taking the birth
control pills, she gave birth to twin daughters.28 The plaintiff contended that the
birth control pills altered the chromosomal structure of his wife, which directly and
proximately caused his twin daughters to develop the trisomy 21 mutation
responsible for Down syndrome in utero.29 The district court dismissed the action
for failing to state a claim because it concluded that no cause of action existed in
Oklahoma for preconception injury to the chromosomal structure of the mother.3 °
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and held
that the plaintiff had stated an actionable claim for two reasons. First, broadly
reading the complaint, the court reasoned that because the plaintiff pled that the
genetic disorder developed in utero due to the mother's altered chromosome
structure, "the pleading should not be construed as being limited to effects or
developments prior to conception." 31 Second, because the twin daughters, rather
than the mother, were the plaintiffs, the only relevant injuries were those suffered
25. 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973).
26. Id. at 238.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 239.
30. Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Labs., Inc., 336 F. Supp. 961, 963 (W.D. Okla. 1972), rev'd, 483
F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973).
31. Jorgensen, 483 F.2d at 239.
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by the twin daughters.32 The court then drew an analogy to several cases where
defendant manufacturers were held liable for manufacturing a defective food
product prior to conception that ultimately caused injury to the infant child upon
consumption.33 The court reasoned that ample precedent supports the notion that
tortious conduct occurring prior to conception is actionable if it ultimately causes
injury to the infant.34
The court's analysis is noteworthy for several reasons. First, the court avoids
the difficult question of whether the mother's altered chromosome structure is in
and of itself an injury by referring to the fact that the plaintiffs pleading contained
references to injuries from teratogenic phenomena rather than injuries that occurred
prior to conception (in which case the causes would be mutagenic in nature).35
Jorgensen says nothing about whether there are two distinct injuries in this fact
pattern (those of the twin daughters and those of the mother). Second, the analogy
to the defective food product line of cases is inapposite, largely because in all of
these cases, it was only the tortious conduct in manufacturing the defective product
that occurred prior to conception. 36 By the court's analogy, the injury occurred only
when the infant child consumed the defective food product.37 The court thus begs
the question by assuming or at least implying that the only relevant injury to the
twin daughters occurred postconception, as did all of the injuries from the defective
food products.38 If this were not the assumption and the possibility that the
daughter's injury occurred preconception was left open, then the defective food
product cases where the injuries unquestionably occurred postconception would not
be analogous.
The contention that by altering the chromosomal structure of the mother, the
injury to the twin daughters themselves occurred preconception is not implausible.
Naturally, this claim could only be brought by children who were subsequently
boM, 39 but the science supporting this chain of reasoning is sound. Once the
chromosomal structure of the putative mother is altered, any subsequent fetus may
have its chromosome structure altered as well. °
32. Id. at 240.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See supra notes 5-19 and accompanying text for an explanation of teratogenic phenomena.
36. Jorgenson, 483 F.2d at 240.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 237 (demonstrating that the injuries at issue are those that occurred to the twins
postconception, and not the "alleged effects on the mother" which occurred preconception).
39. In some jurisdictions, actions may be brought on behalf of the fetuses even if they are not
actually born. See, e.g., Volk v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d I1, 12 (Idaho 1982) (holding that a wrongful death
action for an unborn fetus is a viable claim).
40. See supra text accompanying note 19.
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The core of the problem lies in the nature of genetics. Because any alteration
in the germline chromosome structure of a mother's eggs may be passed on to
descendants,4' it is difficult to pinpoint exactly when the injury occurs. Perhaps the
injury to later-born children occurs when the mother's chromosome structure is
altered. Perhaps it occurs at the moment of conception, in which case it is even
more unclear whether the injury is preconception, postconception, or neither. Or
perhaps the injury in the form of a genetic disorder only occurs in utero, in which
case the injury is postconception. Yet another possibility is that the genetic disorder
is multifactorial, requiring both inheritance of the mother's altered chromosomal
structure as well as environmental influences in utero.42 The boundaries between
these options are hard to discern.43 Perhaps the best solution is to act as the
Jorgensen court did by implying that the boundaries between preconception and
postconception injury are unclear, and that where a plaintiff pleads both, he ought
44not be barred from recovery.
B. Is Increased Risk of Cancer Due to Chromosomal Breakage
a Viable Cause ofAction?
At least one court has held that a plaintiff who presents evidence of increased
risk of cancer due to chromosomal breakage ought to be able to submit the
evidence to the trier of fact.45 In Bryson v. Pillsbury Co., the plaintiff was exposed
to the chemical Captan.4 6 The plaintiff presented evidence of extensive
chromosomal breakage and claimed that she had an increased risk of cancer as a
result of the exposure to Captan.47 The defendant moved for summary judgment,
claiming that the plaintiff assumed the risk of harm and that, in any case, the
plaintiffs claimed damages were too speculative as a matter of law.4 8 Agreeing
with the defendant, the trial court granted the motion.49
41. Id.
42. GELEHRTER ET AL., supra note 5, at 346. Multifactorial inheritance is defined as "traits resulting
from interplay of multiple environmental factors with multiple genes." Id.
43. Some of the new genetic research on biomarkers may aid in pinpointing with precision when
the injury occurs. For a discussion of this new research, see infra notes 188-92 and accompanying text.
Nevertheless, difficulties in pinpointing the time the injury occurred has likely played a role in courts'
unwillingness to recognize the viability of preconception genetic torts.
44. Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Labs., Inc., 483 F.2d 237, 239 (10th Cir. 1973). Of course, there
are other ways to read the Jorgensen court's opinion. Among them is the notion that the court agreed
with the district court's assessment that preconception genetic torts are not actionable. Because in this
case the plaintiff pled post-conception injury, the claim is actionable; whereas, if the plaintiff had pled
preconception injury alone, it would not be. Nonetheless, as noted above, this necessarily begs at least
the scientific question by implying that the injuries all occurred after conception.
45. Bryson v. Pillsbury Co., 573 N.W.2d 718, 721 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
46. Id. at 720.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 720.
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The Court of Appeals of Minnesota reversed the entry of summary judgment
for not proving a present injury, 50 reasoning that there was precedent supporting the
idea that whether chromosomal breakage constitutes a present injury is a question
of fact. 51 So long as the plaintiff proffers expert testimony alleging that
chromosomal breakage is a present injury, the court ruled that whether the
chromosomal alteration rises to the level of a legally compensable injury is an issue
for the trier of fact.52 The court also reversed the grant of summary judgment as to
the plaintiffs claims for present damages, which amounted to claims of damages
for emotional distress and medical monitoring expenses.53 The court found that
since there were genuine issues of material fact as to the existence of a present
injury, there were similar issues of fact as to the damages caused by those
injuries.5 4
However, the court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment as to
the plaintiffs claim for future damages, finding that the plaintiffs expert witness
"admitted that [the plaintiffs] increased risk of cancer could not be measured or
quantified." 55 Thus, the court held that the claim of future damages was too
speculative and not capable of being established with reasonable certainty. 6
Though increased risk of cancer has generally been perceived as a viable cause of
action in the sense that plaintiffs usually survive motions to dismiss and or
summary judgment motions,57 many jurisdictions accept increased risk of cancer
cases only reluctantly, or dismiss the damages as too speculative.
5 8
Furthermore, the scope of the injury affects who has standing to bring an
action. If chromosomal alteration is not an actionable injury in and of itself, then,
for example, the mother of the plaintiffs in Jorgensen could not recover. Her only
injury was the alteration in her chromosome structure; it was her twin daughters
who developed Down syndrome. 59 In addition, by denying chromosomal breakage
status as a sui generis injury, the problem of multi-generational liability may
diminish. This is because subsequent generations may have chromosomal
50. Id. at 722.
51. Id. at 721 (citing Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 901 (D. Minn. 1990)).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See Fournier J. Gale, Ill & James L. Goyer, 1Il, Recovery for Cancerphobia and Increased Risk
of Cancer, 15 CUMB. L. REV. 723, 743 (1984-85) (discussing how numerous courts recognize statistical
evidence of increased risk of cancer as admissible and sufficient to present a question for the jury).
58. See, e.g., Klein v. Weisberg, 694 A.2d 644, 646 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (denying plaintiff
recovery for increased risk of liver cancer claim and holding that damages are only awarded "for [] non-
speculative injuries"); DeStories v. City of Phoenix, 744 P.2d 705, 706-08 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987)
(refusing to award plaintiff damages for claim of increased risk for asbestosis or lung cancer).
59. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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alterations. However, unlike first-generation children, who have both chromosomal
breakage and a concomitant genetic disorder, the subsequent generations may have
no attendant disorder. Thus, the later-generation children will have no actionable
injury if no genetic disorder manifests. In these scenarios, the question of whether
increased risk of cancer is an actionable injury is particularly salient, because this
may be the only avenue for the later-generation children to obtain relief. As
knowledge of the link between specific mutations and disease increases, it is not
difficult to see that if increased risk of cancer is an actionable injury, so too might
increased risk of Alzheimer's disease, increased risk of osteoporosis, and so on and
so forth. The dangers of the "geneticization of lawsuits" are all too real, where
plaintiffs may simply run down the line of genetic disorders until they find one that
may have some link to the particular mutation they possess. 60 This factor may bear
on courts' general unwillingness to recognize preconception genetic tort claims as
viable.
II. THE CAUSE
A. Proximate Causation & Policy Concerns
The majority of courts, however, have disagreed with the Tenth Circuit's
analysis in Jorgensen on the grounds of proximate causation rather than on the
nature of the injury.61 The requirement that a plaintiff prove proximate cause is
longstanding in the law of negligence. 62 Generally, to show proximate cause, a
plaintiff must prove that he or she was in the foreseeable zone of risk of a
defendant's negligence. 63 The idea is that actionable negligence requires a
significant relation in time and place between the parties. 64 As acknowledged by
Chief Judge Cardozo, "[p]roof of negligence in the air ...will not do.",65 The
notion of foreseeability embodies the requirement that the causal connection be
proximate, or related in time and space. Moreover, proximate cause enmeshes the
concepts of duty and foreseeability. Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. stands for
the proposition that one does not owe a duty to anyone not in the foreseeable zone
60. See Bob Van Voris, Tort Lawyers Discover the Power of Genetics, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 14, 1998,
at A16.
61. Of course, courts will often deny proximate cause for policy reasons relating to problems
arising from the imposition of liability for a particular injury. See supra notes 25-60 and accompanying
text.
62. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928); MORTON BARROWS,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE 17 (1899).
63. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 77 (West Group 2000).
64. See Palsgraf 162 N.E. at 101 ("Negligence, like risk, is a term of relation.").
65. Id. at 99 (quoting FREDERICK POLLOCK, TORTS 455 (11 th ed.)).
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of risk.66 In addition, where a court finds a lack of proximate cause, the plaintiff is
cut off from recovery largely for policy reasons.67
A prime example of a court denying recovery in a preconception tort case
based on a proximate cause analysis is Albala v. City of New York.6 8 In this case,
New York's highest court denied relief to a child born with severe brain damage.69
Four years prior to the plaintiffs conception, the mother's uterus had been
perforated due to medical malpractice.7 ° In Albala, the injury was to the uterus, an
organ, rather than to a chromosome. 71 Because the mother's genetic code was not
altered, there was no question that the child's injury occurred postconception and in
utero.72 The court, thus, did not focus on the injury, but rather denied recovery
based on a lack of proximate cause.73 Moreover, the court was alarmed at the
prospect of endless liability where a physician's negligence caused foreseeable
harm to a later-conceived child.74 It seems difficult to comprehend how, based on
the facts of Albala, the defendant in this case could possibly be exposed to multi-
generational liability. Where the structural harm was not genetic, the structural
defect is extremely unlikely to be passed on from parent to offspring past the first
generation.75
66. See id. at 101; see also William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REv. 1, 16 (1953)
("[C]ardozo contended, that the risk may be an outer boundary beyond which duty cannot extend, and
that there is never any duty as to the unforeseeable plaintiff or the unforeseeable damage."). Dean
Prosser demonstrated his prescience in this 1953 article when he noted, "[f]or more than two generations
it has been repeated that there can be no duty toward an unborn child; now all of a sudden the cases on
prenatal injury are going the other way." Id. at 14. It appears that as far as preconception genetic torts
are concerned, the pendulum has swung back in the direction of limited or non-existent duties owed
from defendants to plaintiffs.
67. See Palsgraf 162 N.E. at 103-104 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
The damages must be so connected with the negligence that the latter may be said to be the
proximate cause of the former.... What we do mean by the word 'proximate' is that because
of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to
trace a series of events beyond a certain point.
Id. at 103; see also Atil. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Daniels, 70 S.E. 203, 205 (Ga. Ct. App. 1911)
(reiterating that limitations on proximate cause are arbitrary lines drawn by the court for practical
purposes).
68. 429 N.E.2d 786, 786-87 (N.Y. 1981). As Professor Greenberg notes, some scholars have
contended that this case is "thinly reasoned." Greenberg, supra note 1, at 328 n.120 (citing W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 367 (5th ed. 1984); see also Case
Comment, Preconception Tort as a Basis for Recovery, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 275, 291-92 (1982)
(criticizing Albala as outmoded because its reasoning "unnecessarily produce[s] an unjust result.").
69. Albala, 429 N.E.2d at 787.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. Id. at 788.
74. Id.
75. See Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (II1. 1977) (reasoning that a
physician's negligence in misdiagnosing Rh-compatibility when transfusing blood causes birth defects
2007]
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The New York court's analysis seems more apposite to the facts in Enright v.
Eli Lilly & Co.7 6 There, the New York court refused to impose liability in a strict
products liability claim brought by a third-generation plaintiff against a
manufacturer of DES.77 In coming to its decision, "[t]he Enright court was
concerned that imposing a duty in one case could lead to an expansion of liability
beyond manageable boundaries., 78 The source of the court's fear of boundless
liability was the prospect of multiple-generation liability. 79 The specter of multiple-
generation liability was enough to persuade the court to limit liability to those who
ingested the drug or were directly exposed to its teratogenic effects in utero.
80
In 1986, the Supreme Court of New York in Erie County extended the ruling
of Albala to preconception genetic torts in Catherwood v. American Sterilizer Co.8
In this case, an action was brought on behalf of a child decedent who was
conceived subsequent to the mother's exposure to the mutagen ethylene oxide.82
The plaintiff claimed that this mutagen caused the child's chromosomal damage. 3
The court acknowledged that the issue of whether a preconception genetic tort gave
rise to a cause of action was one of first impression in New York. 84 The court
characterized the court of appeals' decision in Albala as based purely on policy
considerations, 85 and framed the issue of liability in Catherwood solely in terms of
proximate cause and policy analyses.86
The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for policy reasons. First,
the court distinguished Jorgensen by noting that the plaintiff in Catherwood
brought a negligence action, as opposed to the strict liability action at issue in
Jorgensen.87 Furthermore, the court reasoned that limitations on liability are less
necessary in strict liability actions than they are in negligence actions brought on
the basis of exposure to a toxin or mutagen. 88 In addition, the court stated that
to a later-conceived child, fears of multiple-generation liability are groundless where the damage is not
"by its nature, self-perpetuating."). Doubtless the Renslow court is relying on the fact that the
preconception tort in the case is a structural defect in the blood, rather than any alteration to the germline
chromosomal structure.
76. 570 N.E.2d 198 (N.Y. 1991).
77. Id. at 199-200, 204.
78. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 328 (citing Enright, 570 N.E.2d at 203).
79. Enright, 570 N.E.2d at 203.
80. Id.; but see infra Part III.C.
81. 498 N.Y.S.2d 703, 705-06 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
82. Id. at 704.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 705.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 705-06.
87. Id. at 705.
88. Id. at 705-06.
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imposing liability in a preconception tort case is untenable because the plaintiff
would garner a cause of action before he or she actually came into existence.89
This last point, of course, is a policy consideration based not on an analysis of
causation, but on the difficulty of determining the specific point at which the injury
occurs. The Supreme Court of Erie County inverts the assumption made by the
Jorgensen court in identifying the point in time when the injury occurred. Where
the court in Jorgensen implied that the only actionable injury occurred
postconception, 90 the court in Catherwood, in denying the viability of the
preconception genetic tort, assumes that the injury claimed by the plaintiff occurred
entirely preconception.9' If it did not, the perilous policy the court is afraid of
endorsing vanishes. The court very easily could have narrowed its decision so as to
hold that claims brought where the injury is entirely preconception will be
disallowed. It is entirely plausible to reason that though the exposure in
Catherwood occurred preconception, the injury to the later-conceived child
occurred only after conception.92
Under the latter analysis, preconception genetic torts are conflated with the
more well-settled postconception torts, with the caveat that the exposure itself
occurs prior to conception. The consequence of this perspective, however, is that
chromosomal damage with no attendant genetic disorder or syndrome may no
longer be viewed as an injury sui generis, because, by definition, the only
compensable injury would occur after conception. If the injury is perceived as
occurring preconception, then the Catherwood court's concern of a cause of action
accruing to a person not yet in existence is relevant. This is because the
chromosomal breakage that affected the later-conceived child occurred prior to
conception.
Whether or not chromosomal damage is seen as an actionable injury has
many implications for the viability of claims such as increased risk of cancer.
Perhaps much of this may turn upon the pleadings themselves. If the plaintiff in
Catherwood had pled that the exposure occurred before conception and the injuries
occurred subsequent to conception, as did the plaintiffs in Jorgensen, perhaps the
New York court would have decided differently. 93 At the very least, its predilection
89. Id. at 706.
90. See Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Labs., Inc., 483 F.2d 237, 239-40 (10th Cir. 1972).
91. Catherwood, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
92. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text. Of course, this legal plausibility of this claim
will rest on the sufficiency of the proof presented. For a discussion of the difficult proof issues attendant
in preconception genetic torts, see infra notes 121-147 and accompanying text. The court in Catherwood
takes the analysis of proof of preconception injury out of the hands of the jury, and possibly, of any jury
in Erie County in the event that other courts follow its lead in rejecting the viability of preconception
genetic torts.
93. See Catherwood, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 706 (reasoning that a cause of action for a "plaintiff not in
being" is "untenable").
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against animating a cause of action where the plaintiff is not conceived at the point
of injury might not be implicated if a postconception injury is pled.
The court in Catherwood also clothed its decision in terms of duty, stating
that "[iln order to allow a cause of action for pre-conception tort there requires the
finding of a duty to the unconceived. Such a duty can only be couched in terms of a
duty to protect the potentiality of life .... New York has not recognized any such
duty.",94 Of course, the court's reliance on the concept of duty converges perfectly
with its analysis of proximate cause because the two concepts are intertwined.95 As
Dean Prosser explicitly noted, cases involving prenatal torts are a common locus
for issues of limited duty due to the plaintiff not being in the foreseeable zone of
risk.96 However, as Dean Prosser also noted,
There is a duty if the court says there is a duty; the law, like the
Constitution, is what we make it. Duty is only a word with which we
state our conclusion that there is or is not to be liability; it necessarily
begs the essential question. When we find a duty, breach and damage,
everything has been said. 97
Dean Prosser's analysis explains that the divergence between courts in
extending or restraining the boundaries of a particular duty rests on conflicting
policy analyses, rather than any disagreements about whether a legal mandate
compels a particular boundary. Whereas the court in Catherwood was concerned
with extending a duty from defendants to unconceived plaintiffs, other courts have
not felt similarly constrained. For example, the Supreme Court of Indiana
expressed no such qualms in Walker v. Rinck.98 In that case, the plaintiffs were
children who brought an action against a physician for misdiagnosing their
mother's Rh-compatibility during a previous pregnancy. 99 The resultant Rh-
sensitivity in the mother's blood allegedly caused injuries to later-conceived
children.' 00 The court reversed a lower court's grant of summary judgment to the
defendant physician, reasoning that where the plaintiffs were foreseeable, the
physician had a duty to use reasonable care in administering care to the mother.'
0
'
The facts of the case, according to the court, sufficiently illustrated that it was
foreseeable when the defendant physician initially treated the mother knowing that
she might conceive again.10 2 Accordingly, the court held that the defendant
94. Id.
95. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
96. See Prosser, supra note 66, at 14-15.
97. Id. at 15.
98. 604 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ind. 1992).
99. Id. at 592-93.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 595, 597.
102. Id.
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physician did owe a duty to the later-conceived children of the mother because they
were foreseeable plaintiffs.' 03
However, in reiterating his point that a court's refusal to extend duty or
proximate cause follows rather than precedes the court's conclusion that liability
ought not attach to a defendant based on the given fact pattern, Dean Prosser
cautions that duty and foreseeability are not interchangeable concepts.' 4 That is,
courts do not always impose liability where a plaintiff was foreseeable. 10 5 The
Albala court's decision evinces this notion. The court granted that it was
foreseeable that when the mother underwent an abortion, she might at some point
wish to conceive again, and thus any later-conceived children were in the
foreseeable zone of risk of the defendant's negligence in performing the prior
abortion. 10 6 Nevertheless, the court found that the presence of foreseeability alone
was not enough to establish a duty from the defendant to the plaintiff in this case. 10 7
Whereas foreseeability was enough to establish a duty from the defendant to the
plaintiff in Walker, it was not sufficient to establish a duty in Albala. If issues of
proximate cause and duty turn on policy considerations, the logical question
becomes what policy considerations have prompted the majority of courts to deny
proximate cause and duty to plaintiffs in preconception genetic torts?
The major reason courts deny recovery for preconception genetic torts is fear
of multiple-generation liability. Courts are afraid that no practical limit on liability
may exist. 0 8 A commentator described the rationale of courts in this position:
[I]f courts were to allow the first generation of plaintiffs to recover, they
would also be required to allow later generations to recover. Subjecting
a tortfeasor to these claims by multiple generations would impose a
burden disproportionate to the risk created. To avoid such a result, and
to keep from drawing unprincipled distinctions between first generation
and later generation plaintiffs, it is better to deny recovery to all
preconception injury plaintiffs.'0 9
Thus, multiple-generation liability is disfavored not only because it is
inherently unfair to the defendant. 110 Courts also fear that if they allowed first
103. Id. at 595. In the language of Palsgraf, the court's findings rested upon the notion that the
children were in the foreseeable zone of risk. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
104. Prosser, supra note 66, at 16 ("[D]uty does not always coincide with the foreseeable risk.").
105. See id. (explaining by example that an observer owes no duty to a drowning swimmer).
106. Albala v. City of N.Y., 429 N.E.2d 786, 788 (N.Y. 1981).
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198, 203 (N.Y. 1991) (explaining that liability
for DES manufacturers should be limited "to those who ingested the drug or were exposed to it in
utero").
109. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 345.
110. Perhaps the unfairness to the defendant changes depending on whether the plaintiff brings a
claim for negligence or strict liability. The court in Catherwood may have been implying this when it
reasoned that cutting off liability in a preconception tort case might be better justified when the plaintiff
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generation plaintiffs to recover, in order to avoid imposing limitless liability on a
defendant, they might have to cut off second and third generation plaintiffs for no
reason other than that they are second and third generation plaintiffs."' This,
according to Professor Greenberg, is too arbitrary for the courts, and so they deny
recovery to any plaintiff for preconception genetic torts., 2
The Supreme Court of Illinois may have been the first to address the issue of
multiple-generation liability for preconception torts in Renslow v. Mennonite
Hospital.1 3 In this case, a physician negligently transfused the plaintiffs mother
with 500 cubic centimeters of Rh-positive blood.' '4 The transfusion caused
sensitization of the mother's Rh-negative blood. 15 Nine years later, she gave birth
to the plaintiff, who suffered from severe brain and organ damage, allegedly caused
by the Rh-sensitivity. 1 6 Though the majority found that the plaintiff had stated a
viable cause of action, Justice Ryan dissented. 1 7 Among the reasons for his dissent
were fears of multiple-generation liability." 8 Furthermore, Justice Ryan introduced
the issue of insurance into the equation. He opined that "[u]nder these
circumstances, it is difficult to perceive how an individual or institution could
adequately provide insurance coverage, or how an insurer could establish reserves
to cover a potential loss."" 9
According to this line of reasoning, the difficulty in obtaining insurance
would increase the unfairness of exposing a defendant to multiple-generation
liability, not to mention the burden that the insurer of the putative defendant would
have to carry. Should the burden become unmanageable, it "may lead
manufacturers and service providers to stop providing potentially useful
brings an action in negligence rather than in strict liability. See 498 N.Y.S.2d 703, 705-06 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1986). Issues of duty and foreseeability do not arise under strict liability. Vanessa Merton, The
Exclusion of Pregnant, Pregnable, and Once-Pregnable People (a.k.a. Women) fiom Biomedical
Research, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 369, 410 (1993) (noting how the Jorgensen court "did not need to reach
issues of duty or foreseeability" because claims were brought under a theory of strict products liability).
11. See, e.g., Enright, 570 N.E.2d at 203 (explaining that a plaintiff's cause of action "could not be
confined without the drawing of artificial and arbitrary boundaries" since "the rippling effect of DES
exposure may extend for generations").
112. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 344-45.
113. 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1251 (Il1. 1977).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1262 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 1264.
119. Id. In Renslow, the birth defects were not caused by alterations in the chromosomal structure of
either the mother or the later-conceived child, but rather by Rh-sensitivity in the mother's blood. Id. at
1251. Nevertheless, Justice Ryan was alarmed at the creation of a general precedent for preconception
torts, which, he reasoned, could very well sustain the viability of a preconception genetically transmitted
tort. Id. at 1264.
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commodities and services.' ' a In addition, second and third generation plaintiffs
might be unable to recover anything from a defendant that has either gone bankrupt
due to litigation or that has been unable to obtain insurance. In this case, the fear of
the arbitrary cut-off between first and later generation plaintiffs that motivated the
court in Enright and Justice Ryan in Renslow may be drawn by the market, rather
than the judicial system.
B. Difficulties of Proof and Consequences of Proving Causation
Another policy consideration that has motivated courts to deny the viability of
preconception genetic torts are the extremely difficult issues of proof,12 which
revolve around "the difficulty of establishing the causal link between a child's
health problem and the defendant's preconceptual conduct."' 2 2 For example, the
mother in the Jorgensen case was apparently told that the pills she took were
completely safe to use, and was given no warning of any possible harm.'
23
Nonetheless, "[w]hether she could have proved this warranty and lack of warning,
and then proven that the pills caused an alteration in her chromosomes, is not at all
clear."'
' 24
The case of Wintz v. Northrop Corp. demonstrates the significant burden the
plaintiff has in mustering enough evidence of causation.1 25 In this case, a husband
and wife brought an action both individually and on behalf of their daughter,
Jessica, against Eastman Kodak Company and Northrop Corporation, the latter of
which was the mother's employer. 26 The mother worked as an industrial engineer
both prior to and during her pregnancy. 27 Her line of work involved mixing
various chemicals, one of which was bromide, to develop photographic film.' 21 She
alleged that she had inhaled bromide dust both prior to and during her pregnancy
with her daughter.' 29 After Jessica was born, she exhibited several abnormalities,
including poor muscle tone, a weak sucking reflex, infrequent cry, and anomalous
facial features.1
30
120. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 345.
121. See, e.g., Catherwood v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 498 N.Y.S.2d 703, 706 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) ("If
the cause of action accrues long before conception, how can a plaintiff not in being at date of accrual
have a cause of action.").
122. Merton, supra note 110, at 406.
123. Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Labs., Inc., 483 F.2d 237, 238-39 (10th Cir. 1973).
124. Merton, supra note 110, at 411; Jorgensen, 483 F.2d at 241.
125. 110 F.3d 508, 516 (7th Cir. 1997).
126. Id. at 510.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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The treating physician suspected elevated bromide levels were the cause of
the baby's behavioral abnormalities, and ordered bromide tests for both the child
and the mother.13 ' Four years later, Jessica was examined by a different physician,
Dr. Barbara Burton, an expert in genetic disorders. 32 After examining Jessica's
symptoms, which then included myopia, problems with the enamel in her teeth,
frequent respiratory infections, and abnormal mental development, Dr. Burton
diagnosed Jessica with a genetic disorder known as Prader-Willi syndrome.1
33
Subsequent tests confirmed this diagnosis. 34 According to the court's findings of
fact, Prader-Willi syndrome "is caused by a deletion of genetic material from the
father's chromosomes. It is a purely genetic disorder which occurs prior to
conception, and it cannot be caused by environmental exposure."'
' 35
The plaintiffs retained a toxicologist as an expert witness. 3 6 The toxicologist
was going to testify that exposure to bromide, rather than Prader-Willi syndrome,
caused Jessica's developmental anomalies. 37 The defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment.' 38 They claimed that a toxicologist was not properly qualified
under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to testify as to the comparative effects of
bromide and Prader-Willi syndrome on a child because the toxicologist was not a
licensed physician. 39 The federal district judge granted the motion, 4' and the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.'
4
'
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the defendants that the toxicologist simply
did not have the requisite knowledge and experience to enable him to offer expert
testimony on the principles of toxicology as applied to a human. 142 As the court
noted, he had no knowledge of the frequency or quantity of the bromide to which
the mother was exposed, nor the extent to which her work environment was
ventilated, nor whether she wore a mask at work. 4 3 The court reasoned that at best
the toxicologist professed expertise as to a "general understanding of bromide, with
only unsupported speculation having been used to relate the general knowledge to
the facts surrounding [the mother's] exposure."' 44 Moreover, the original treating
131. Id.
132. Id. at 511
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 511-12.
141. Id. at 516.
142. Id. at 513.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 514.
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physician testified that Jessica's physical and mental abnormalities were very likely
to have been caused by Prader-Willi syndrome.145 The court found that under these
circumstances, the plaintiffs had not met their burden of showing proximate cause
under Illinois law, which required a showing to a reasonable medical certainty that
the defendant's acts caused the injury. 146
It is not clear what the plaintiffs could have done to survive summary
judgment. Arguably, the defendants could have attacked the qualifications of any
physician proffered as an expert witness by the plaintiffs on the grounds that he or
she did not possess the requisite knowledge on the toxic effects of bromide.
147
Perhaps both a toxicologist and a physician would have to be called, although the
defendant might object on the grounds that an expert in genetics would be needed.
It is simply not clear what expert testimony would have been required to sustain the
plaintiffs claim. The question of how to present expert testimony on genetics
moves this inquiry into a different constellation of issues-the role that genetic
information may play in personal injury litigation.
C. The "Geneticization " of Personal Injury Litigation
A related policy concern is the fear of the so-called "geneticization" of civil
litigation. 148 Consider Severson v. Markem Corp.,149 an unreported 1990 California
case. In that case, a plaintiff claimed that her son's severe birth defects were caused
by in utero exposure to methyl ethyl ketone. 150 The defendant claimed that the
plaintiffs injuries were caused by a genetic disorder called fragile X syndrome. 15 1
The defendant filed a motion asking the court to require the plaintiff to undergo
genetic testing to ascertain whether the plaintiff was afflicted with fragile X
145. Id. at 514-15.
146. Id. ("Proximate cause can only be established when there is a reasonable certainty that the
defendant's acts caused the injury.") (quoting Schultz v. Hennessy Indus., 584 N.E.2d 235, 241 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991)).
147. This, of course, should not be taken as an argument that the plaintiffs proffered no witness who
could have been qualified as an expert. It is only meant to show the intricacy of proof of causation issues
that arises in preconception genetic tort cases.
148. Bob Van Voris, Tort Lawyers Discover the Power of Genetics, NAT'L L.J., September 14,
1998, at A16.
149. See generally Mark A. Rothstein, Preventing the Discovery of Plaintiff Genetic Profiles by
Defendants Seeking to Limit Damages in Personal Injury Litigation, 71 IND. L.J. 877, 899, 899 n.170
(1996) (using Severson as an example of the negative consequences of court ordered genetic profiles);
Sally Lehrman, Pushing Limits of DNA Testing: Suit Prompts Study into Whether a Birth Defect Was
Inherited or Caused by Toxics, S.F. EXAM'R, June 5, 1994, at A l (discussing the facts of the case).
150. Rothstein, supra note 149, at 899.
151. Id.
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syndrome. 152 The court granted the motion, "rejecting the argument that this was an
invasive procedure which would cause severe distress.' 53
The facts in Severson are analogous to those in Wintz, but there are two
significant differences. However, these differences only render the analogy
imperfect. First, the plaintiff in Severson unquestionably suffered a postconception
injury in that the exposure occurred in utero, whereas there was a question as to
when the daughter's injuries occurred in Wintz. Second, the plaintiff daughter in
Wintz unquestionably was afflicted with a genetic disorder, while this was a crucial
question in Severson. It does not tax the imagination, however, to envision an
amalgam of these two cases: where a plaintiff brings a claim for a preconception
genetic tort and where there is substantial dispute as to whether the plaintiff suffers
from a genetic disorder unrelated to the defendant's negligence. In this scenario, a
defendant would in all likelihood make a motion to compel the plaintiff to undergo
genetic testing to confirm or disconfirm whether the plaintiff is afflicted with the
relevant genetic disorder.
Gary Marchant argues that because "[t]here are major data gaps and
uncertainties about the health risks of most potentially toxic substances," new
"genetic developments" have the potential to fill some of these conceptual gaps
take on increased importance in toxic tort litigation. 54 On the other hand, he notes
that use of genetic data may render toxic tort litigation "even more complex,
contentious, and ethically problematic."' 155 He notes two kinds of genetic data most
likely to be used in toxic tort litigation: "data on genetic susceptibility of individual
plaintiffs" and "genetic biomarkers of exposure and effect."' 56 As to the former, he
acknowledges the likelihood that toxic tort claims that turn on issues of genetic
susceptibility will require "genetic test data from the individual plaintiff showing
the presence or absence of the genetic trait at issue" to survive summary judgment
on the issue of causation. 157 He even cites an expert who has argued that it should
152. See id.
153. Id. at 899 n. 172 (chronicling that the plaintiff in Severson "was terrified of needles and had to
be held down by his mother" during a court ordered blood testing and suffered emotional trauma as a
result).
154. Gary E. Marchant, Genetic Data in Toxic Tort Litigation, 14 J.L. & POL'Y 7, 7-8 (2006)
[hereinafter Marchant, Toxic Tort Litigation]. For further discussion of the use of genetic data in the
courtroom from Marchant, see Gary E. Marchant, Genetics and Toxic Torts, 31 SETON HALL L. REV.
949, 980 (2001) (discussing how different types of genetic information could be applied in toxic injury
litigation); Gary E. Marchant, Genetic Susceptibility and Biornarkers in Toxic Injury Litigation, 41
JURIMETRICS 67, 102-03 (2000) (exploring the potential and existing uses of biomarkers in toxic tort
litigation and evaluating the issues they raise).
155. Marchant, Toxic Tort Litigation, supra note 154, at 8.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 13.
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be common practice "for defendants to seek genetic testing of plaintiffs in order to
identify potential alternative causes."
' ' 58
In a 1996 article, Professor Mark Rothstein canvassed the public policy
reasons militating against permitting coerced genetic testing of the kind in
Severson.159 He argues that forcing a plaintiff to undergo genetic testing is a serious
infringement on the plaintiffs right to privacy. 160 Rothstein identifies three
different forms of privacy threatened by the sort of compelled genetic ordered in
Severson: (1) physical privacy, (2) informational privacy, and (3) decisional
privacy. 6 1 By forcing the plaintiff to have blood drawn or even a cotton swab
deployed in his or her mouth, the plaintiffs physical privacy is violated. 62 The
results of the genetic test constitute a compelled disclosure of information and
thereby are a violation of the right not to disseminate information about oneself,
constituting a violation of informational privacy. 163 Finally, forcing the plaintiff to
submit to the genetic test without his or her consent constitutes a transgression on
decisional privacy. 164 Rothstein argues that the decision of whether or not to
undergo genetic testing can be extremely difficult, and that forcing a plaintiff to
undergo this procedure violates the plaintiffs autonomy by taking the decision out
of his or her hands.
165
Second, compelled genetic testing raises concerns regarding
confidentiality.' 66 In contrast to privacy, which relates to the right to prevent
anyone from acquiring personal information, "confidentiality refers to an
individual's reasonable expectation that certain sensitive information revealed
within a confidential relationship will not be redisclosed to a third party without the
individual's consent.' 67 Although the view prevails that in personal injury
litigation the patient impliedly consents to the disclosure of medical information by
making his or her medical status an issue in the case, 16 8 the unique nature of genetic
information makes the consequences of compelled disclosure all the more stark. 1
69
158. Id. at 13-14 (citing Diane E. Lewis, Under a Genetic Cloud: The Benefits of DNA Testing Come
with a Potential for Abuse, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 14, 1994, at A 1).
159. Rothstein, supra note 149, at 894-99.
160. Id. at 894-95.
161. Id. at 894.
162. Id. at 895.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 896.
167. ld. (citing William J. Winslade, Confidentiality, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 451-52
(Warran T. Reich, ed., 1995).
168. Rothstein, supra note 149, at 896.
169. Id. at 894-98.
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Disclosure of genetic information subjects an individual to risks of public
stigma and humiliation. 7 ° Such information has been referred to as a future diary,
inasmuch as it reveals information about an individual's past, present, and future
relatives.' 7 ' Furthermore, genetic testing may reveal information about paternity,
which is somewhat prone to error. 72 Fears of later disclosure of such information
may have a chilling effect on genetic research, in that individuals may refuse to
participate in genetic research because of concerns that genetic test results could
conceivably be discovered by employers, insurers, or other third parties. 1
7 3
These scenarios by their nature are particularly likely to arise in
preconception genetic tort cases. This is because the injury in a preconception
genetic tort case will either simply be a chromosomal alteration or a concomitant
(and perhaps resultant) genetic disorder. Where a particular genetic disorder could
not be caused by exposure to any kind of mutagen or toxin, a defendant will in all
likelihood desire to show that the plaintiffs injury was a consequence of the
genetic disorder rather than the defendant's negligence. The fact that this problem
has not yet arisen-or, at least, that no court has mentioned it-in a preconception
genetic tort case can be explained first by the paucity of such cases in general, and
second by courts' general unwillingness to recognize preconception genetic torts as
a viable cause of action. Nonetheless, the inherent problems raised by compelled
genetic testing may well factor into a future court's analysis regarding whether to
recognize a preconception genetic tort claim as viable or to dismiss the claim for
policy reasons.
In short, Rothstein concludes that concerns of privacy and confidentiality
merit attempts to prohibit defendants from seeking to compel plaintiffs in personal
injury litigation to undergo genetic testing. While I agree with Rothstein that the
privacy and confidentiality concerns are serious and merit careful attention, the
significance of his recommendations is to urge that genetic information be treated
exceptionally. I think genetic exceptionalism in the realm of preconception genetic
torts is exceedingly unwise for a variety of reasons, a topic to which I turn now.
170. Id. at 896.
171. Id.; George J. Annas, Privacy Rules for DNA Databanks: Protecting Coded 'Future Diaries',
270 JAMA 2346, 2346 (1993).
172. Rothstein, supra note 149, at 896-97.
173. Id. at 897.
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III. THE RECOMMENDATION
A. The Pitfalls of Genetic Exceptionalism
Preconception torts are more widely accepted as viable causes of action than
are preconception genetic torts, evidenced by the DES cases. 174 The fact that
preconception genetic torts are not generally recognized necessitates some
distinguishing factor between preconception torts where chromosomal breakage to
the mother is not involved, and where it is. This article has attempted to suggest
some possible reasons for the divergent treatment by the courts, including multiple-
generation liability, difficult proof issues, and concerns about the geneticization of
personal injury litigation.
The question is, are these reasons enough to justify the distinction between
preconception torts and preconception genetic torts? More broadly, several scholars
are alarmed at the culture of "genetic exceptionalism" that permeates the legislative
and judicial landscape. 175 For example, Gostin and Hodge have expressed concern
at the number of laws protecting genetic privacy, compared to the dearth of statutes
comprehensively addressing privacy in general. 1
76
Suter argues that "genetic information is not unique and that concerns about
abuses of information should not be limited to genetic information, but should
extend to other medical information." 77 She reasons that "[tihe presumption that
genetic information is unique is severely tested by the fact that no sharp line
divides genetic from nongenetic information. Instead, there is a great deal of
overlap between these categories, making line-drawing exceedingly difficult."'
178
Even assuming that unique concerns are raised in a genetic paradigm, it does
not necessarily follow that preconception genetic torts ought to be treated in
174. See Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated Biomedical
Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 637-39 (2003); but see, e.g., Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d
198, 204 (N.Y. 1991), cert denied, 522 U.S. 868 (1991).
175. Lawrence 0. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Genetic Privacy and the Law: An End to Genetics
Exceptionalism, 40 JURIMETRICS 21, 23 (1999). "Genetics exceptionalism" is the term the authors use to
describe the belief that genetic information by virtue of its uniqueness is entitled to greater privacy
protections than other kinds of information. Id. at 23, 31. Of course, fears of the "geneticization" of civil
litigation rely to some extent on the unique nature of genetic information. Id. at 31. Nevertheless, Gostin
and Hodge raise important questions about the dangers of genetics exceptionalism, which ought to be
considered in any analysis of genetic information and policy. Id. at 31-36. Such an analysis is somewhat
beyond the scope of this inquiry (which is focused on the viability of preconception genetic torts), but
concerns about genetics exceptionalism are relevant to the extent they cast doubt on the justification and
efficacy of treating preconception genetic torts differently from other preconception or even
postconception torts.
176. Id. at 41-53.
177. Sonia M. Suter, The Allure and Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism: Do We Need Special
Genetics Legislation?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 669, 671 (2001).
178. Id. at 701.
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drastically different ways from preconception torts not involving chromosomal
breakage. Professors Gostin and Hodge frame the inquiry in terms of the adverse
consequences that arise out of legislatures creating law that treats genetic policy
issues differently from other kinds of policy issues. 17 9
The point is that the common law ought to grapple with these issues on a
case-by-case basis. Simply banning preconception genetic torts by declaring that
they are not viable claims is ill-advised. As nearly all courts specifically addressing
the problem have noted explicitly or implicitly, preconception genetic torts pose
novel and challenging issues. However, setting precedent denying the cause of
action in and of itself is a knee-jerk response to a problem that is unlikely to vanish
altogether. Moreover, upon examination of court's cited fears regarding injury and
causation in a preconception genetic tort paradigm, the knee-jerk response is not
justified.
B. Difficulties in Pinpointing the Injury Do Not Justify Denial of Relief
In many cases, a genetic disorder will manifest itself in conjunction with a
chromosomal alteration. In Jorgensen, the plaintiffs were born with Down
syndrome. 180 In Wintz, the daughter Jessica was diagnosed with Prader-Willi
syndrome. 18' The fact that a plaintiff has undoubtedly suffered some harm does not
relieve the plaintiff from any difficulties in proving causation, but where a genetic
disorder or condition is present, it is clear that some kind of harm has befallen the
later-conceived person.
Moreover, new research on biomarkers, or biologic markers, 182 has
dramatically increased geneticists' ability to "delineate more precisely how a given
ambient toxic exposure causes disease by tracing the 'molecular footprints' as the
toxin passes through the body, interacts with critical target molecules in the body,
and produces the molecular and cellular effects that eventually manifest as
pathology.' 83 This new research has particular importance for occupational or
environmental exposure cases. 184 In other words, biomarkers may help in
determining the specific steps in the causal pathway that a toxin takes in producing
a given injury.' 85 In effect, biomarkers may help to pinpoint the point at which a
particular genetic disorder manifests by identifying the sequence of causal effects
179. Gostin & Hodge, supra note 175, at 23-24.
180. Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Labs., Inc., 483 F.2d 237, 238 (10th Cir. 1973).
181. Wintz v. Northrop Corp., 110 F.3d 508, 511 (7th Cir. 1997).
182. A biomarker is a "biochemical, molecular, genetic, immunologic, physiologic, or other signal
of events in biologic systems." Paul W. Brandt-Rauf & Sherry 1. Brandt-Rauf, Biomarkers-Scientific
Advances and Societal Implications, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND
CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 184, 184 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997).
183. Id. at 184-85.
184. id. at 185.
185. Id.
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on the genetic level. As such, "[b]iomarkers may be important in ... establishing
the subclinical or preclinical harms upon which damages for future harms may be
based."' 86 The establishment of these types of harms is absolutely crucial in
preconception genetic tort claims, and the biomarker research may indicate whether
the injury occurs preconception, at the moment of conception, or postconception
based on the particular step in the causal pathway that the disorder manifests.
However, even assuming the difficulties in pinpointing when the precise
injury occurs are not overcome, these difficulties do not justify barring relief for
every preconception genetic tort. The distinction between permitting recovery for
postconception torts and preconception torts seems somewhat arbitrary, especially
in light of the fact that increased risk of cancer due to chromosomal alteration is
generally an actionable, albeit controversial tort.' 87 Where a plaintiff cannot
adequately prove that an injury occurred, or cannot prove the causal link between
the negligence and the injury, that plaintiff ought to be barred from recovery.
However, the difficulty in pinpointing when the injury has occurred is a weak
justification for barring any recovery whatsoever for plaintiffs who have
undoubtedly suffered harm in most cases. Furthermore, the most controversial
aspect of the injury issue in preconception genetic tort cases is often the mother's
individual claim for increased risk of cancer due to chromosomal alteration. Where
many courts now, at a minimum, refuse to dismiss such claims or refuse to grant
summary judgment, 188 the reasons for denying the viability of preconception
genetic tort claims because of the questions surrounding the claimed injuries are
even less persuasive.
C. Proximate Cause Policy Considerations Do Not Justify Barring Recovery
In spite of many courts' doubts about the existence of a duty owed to persons
not yet in existence, "courts throughout the country [have] abandoned the no-duty
rule, and virtually all jurisdictions presently recognize a child's cause of action for
the consequences of prenatal injuries."' 89 Part of the reason for this is that the
concept of foreseeability can be used by courts to limit preconception genetic tort
liability.' 90 Where a potential injury to a later-conceived person is foreseeable, it is
much easier for courts to impose a duty.' 9' Again, the link between foreseeability
186. Id. at 192.
187. See Greenberg, supra note 1, at 353-54 (contending that there is "no principled reason" for the
distinction between an action where the injury occurs shortly after birth and an action where the injury
occurs at the moment of birth).
188. E.g., Cudone v. Gehret, 821 F. Supp. 266, 271 (D. Del. 1993); Karol v. Berkow, 603 A.2d 547,
550-51 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992); D'Augustino v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 980 F. Supp. 1452,
1455 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
189. Lynch v. Scheininger, 744 A.2d 113, 120 (N.J. 2000).
190. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 355.
191. Id.
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and duty reflects the intertwining of the concepts of proximate cause and duty. As
Chief Judge Cardozo noted in Palsgraf, a duty is owed to someone in the
foreseeable zone of risk. 192 If the injury to the later-conceived person is deemed
foreseeable, then a proper Palsgraf analysis dictates that the court ought to impose
a duty on the defendant charged with negligence who caused the injury. If the
injury is not foreseeable, then the plaintiff is not within the zone of risk, and no
duty should be imposed. 93 As Professor Greenberg explained, "[a]ny action that
would foreseeably harm a woman's reproductive system and her ability to carry a
child to term would presumably also foreseeably harm a child she conceives in the
future."'
194
The court in Albala, for example, recognized that where a doctor's negligence
resulted in a woman's perforated uterus, it was foreseeable that this negligence
could deleteriously affect the health of later-conceived children. 95 However, this
did not stop the Albala court from denying the viability of a preconception tort.96
Nonetheless, the fact that a proper Palsgraf analysis of foreseeability may be used
to set boundaries of reasonable recovery for preconception genetic torts is reason
for affirming the viability of preconception genetic torts. In addition, the
applicability of a Palsgraf foreseeability analysis underscores the notion that
genetic torts need not be treated differently from other kinds of torts. This follows
inasmuch as modem courts frequently apply analyses of foreseeability to determine
whether to deny proximate cause; there is no reason that such an analysis cannot be
applied to preconception genetic torts.
Moreover, the problem of multi-generational liability is the proverbial storm
in a teacup. First, few claims involving multi-generational liability in preconception
tort cases have been reported or even cited in any case where a court raises the
issue.' 97 Second, where a later-generation plaintiff brings such a claim,
[T]he injury suffered by the first generation must be significant enough
to constitute a compensable injury, but not so significant that it alters the
first generation's ability to conceive. Although toxic agents may exist
that are capable of causing such harm, no such claims have been brought
to date. 98
DES is one such agent, as demonstrated by the third generation plaintiff in
Enright.'99 Judge Hancock explained in his dissent in Enright the somewhat
192. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
193. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 355.
194. Id.
195. Albala v. City of N.Y., 429 N.E.2d 786, 788 (N.Y. 1981). For further discussion of Albala, see
supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
196. Id.
197. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 345, 356.
198. Id. at 345.
199. Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198, 199 (N.Y. 1991).
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grotesque irony of denying relief to later-generation victims because of fears of
boundless liability:
[W]hen defendants' arguments are applied here to urge that although
claims of DES daughters should be allowed the claims of
granddaughters should not be, their forebodings strike a particularly
ironic note: i.e., the very fact of the "insidious nature" of DES which
may make the defendants liable for injuries to a future generation is
advanced as the reason why they should not be liable for injuries to that
generation .200
The irony of this argument ought not mask its injustice. There seems
something intuitively unfair about denying recovery to later-generation plaintiffs
solely because the particular agent responsible for their injuries has multi-
generational effects. This unfairness is compounded by the dearth of such later-
generation preconception tort claims. Perhaps if such claims were inundating the
courts, concerns of boundless liability might be relevant, but such cases are rare.
20 1
Moreover, there are dangerous policy implications arising from signaling to drug
and chemical manufacturers that any liability they may accrue from marketing a
defective product will automatically cut off after one generation of plaintiffs.2 °2
Third, if and when multiple-generation liability claims begin to frequent, or
occur at all, in the judicial system, "the courts or legislatures will need to establish
reasonable boundaries for recovery." 20 3 Furthermore, to deny recovery by
dismissing cases where obvious harm has been done to a plaintiff before it reaches
the trier of fact, and where a defendant has been negligent, is irrational when
justified on the basis of a fear that has yet to materialize. 204
Finally, the fears of the possible geneticization of civil litigation are
reasonable and worrisome. However, these concerns extend beyond the parameters
of preconception genetic tort claims into all types of personal injury claims. In any
personal injury action, a defendant may seek to compel a plaintiff to submit to
genetic testing, on the theory that if the plaintiff has a reduced life expectancy due
to a genetic disorder, the plaintiff will be entitled to a lower damage amount.
20 5
Thus, these concerns are relevant in the entire arena of personal injury litigation.
Using these fears as a justification for rejecting the viability of preconception
genetic tort claims will do little to solve the systemic problem that may grow into
200. Id. at 207 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
201. Of course, one could argue the reason for the paucity is because putative plaintiffs know that
courts generally disfavor them, and that if courts permitted them, they would rapidly grow in number.
However, the dearth of these claims is apparent even in jurisdictions which permit preconception genetic
torts.
202. See Enright, 570 N.E.2d at 207 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
203. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 356.
204. Id.
205. Rothstein, supra note 149, at 878.
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the geneticization of personal injury litigation. The problem will still exist,
regardless of whether preconception genetic torts are viable causes of action.
Moreover, there seems little justification for "exceptionalizing" the
geneticization of litigation by prohibiting compelled genetic testing. Marchant
seems to agree, arguing that a "blanket prohibition on any use of genomic data in
order to protect plaintiffs' confidentiality would be unwise, because both plaintiffs
and defendants can benefit from such data in appropriate cases. '0 6 He also
contends that "plaintiffs who put their health status at issue by bringing the
litigation cannot expect such a blanket prohibition., 20 7 This point is directly
analogous to the generally required disclosure of health records of plaintiffs
bringing medical malpractice suits. The argument in the latter scenario, which is
not widely disputed, is simply that if the plaintiff is uncomfortable sharing details
of their health information, then they should not bring a suit that places the contents
of that health information directly at issue.20 8 Why litigation implicating genetic
information should be treated so differently is unclear.
Of course, the argument here is simply that exceptionalizing genomic data by
prohibiting its usage or even prohibiting compelled genetic testing if a court finds
that genetic information is vital to the litigation is unwise. It does not follow that
courts ought to admit such evidence with no hesitation or freely order plaintiffs to
undergo genetic testing. The argument that genetic information does not seem to
merit exceptional treatment does not imply that there are no material differences
between genetic information and other kinds of individually identifiable health
information. Requests for the disclosure of genetic information or requests to
compel the plaintiff to undergo genetic testing should, like many other evidentiary
matters in toxic tort litigation, be handled on an individual basis.
206. Marchant, Toxic Tort Litigation, supra note 154, at 35.
207. Id.
208. See, e.g., Scott D. Stein, What Litigators Need to Know About HIPAA, 36 J. HEALTH L. 433,
438 (2003) ("[A] plaintiff who puts his medical condition at issue in a lawsuit, such as by filing a
medical malpractice suit, traditionally has been deemed to have waived any right to object to the
disclosure of personal medical information. The rationale is that when a party puts his medical condition
at issue, that party cannot deprive the opposing party of relevant evidence on that issue."); Marian E.
Silber & Maria Elyse Rabar, Access to Medical Records, 8 HEALTH LAW. 10, 10 (1996) ("It is axiomatic
that by initiating a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff puts his or her physical condition at issue and
waives the physician-patient privilege and any right to confidentiality accruing therefrom."). Silber &
Rabar explain:
Part and parcel of such a waiver is the requirement that a plaintiff provide access to records
of all health care providers with information relating to medical history, diagnosis, and
treatment. Those records are frequently as critical to the preparation of the defense of the
litigation as they are to its prosecution, and the importance of equal access to the materials
has been recognized.
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Marchant points out that "[f]ocused and scientifically-justified genetic
inquiries and tests can help to resolve some lawsuits., 20 9 However, he
acknowledges, that "broader and more intrusive 'fishing expeditions' into the
plaintiffs genome that lack any probable cause in terms of having a reasonable
basis for investigating a specific gene or trait are likely to create more mischief than
insight needed to resolve a case."2 10 Rather than prohibiting the use of such
information, or even the compelled genetic testing, courts have a variety of tools in
their judicial armamentarium for assessing the merits of such requests in the course
of discovery. Indeed, determining whether to compel disclosure or deny it on the
basis that it is a "fishing expedition" is one of a trial judge's more common
activities in the discovery process. Similarly common is the use of protective orders
that circumscribe and narrow the disclosure of sensitive and personal
information. 211
Thus, there seems little basis for arguing that genetic information is so
different that the judge's diverse set of instruments in this regard should be ignored
by simply stating that no plaintiff ever may be compelled to undergo genetic testing
even where the basis of their case turns on the plaintiffs genome. 212 Garrison
argues that "the court system already deals with highly personal and protected
information on a daily basis, and there is no reason why such safeguards cannot be
successfully applied to genetic information." 213 A fortiori, there is even less merit in
using the concerns of the geneticization of litigation as a reason for denying
altogether the viability of preconception genetic torts.
CONCLUSION
There is little reason, neither for "pure" legal considerations, nor for policy
concerns, to prevent any preconception genetic tort claim from being brought
before a trier of fact. To be sure, difficult issues of proof, especially of causation,
may prove daunting to the success of these claims in obtaining compensation.
However, this is hardly a reason to deny all such claims before a plaintiff has an
209. Marchant, Toxic Tort Litigation, supra note 154, at 35.
210. Id.at35-36.
211. Jordan K. Garrison, Note, Courts Face the Exciting and the Inevitable. DNA in Civil Trials, 23
REV. LITIG. 435, 458 (2004).
212. See id. at 446 (citing Thomas H. Murray, Genetic Exceptionalism and "Future Diaries": Is
Genetic Information Different from Other Medical Information?, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 60, 61 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997))
(highlighting the conclusion of a task force working under the Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications
arm of the Human Genome Project that genetic information is not so different from other kinds of health
information as to merit exceptional protections).
213. Garrison, supra note 211, at 458; accord Marchant, Toxic Tort Litigation, supra note 154, at 36
("Courts must use their discretion ... to determine which genetic tests and data are justified, and also to
provide for protective orders in appropriate cases to prevent disclosure of a plaintiffs genetic
information to non-parties.").
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opportunity to bring forth such proof. Moreover, the Albala court's concern over
the proliferation of frivolous lawsuits that could occur if preconception genetic torts
are ruled to be viable causes of action seems to be much ado about nothing,
particularly where so few preconception genetic tort claims have been brought in
the last twenty years. In any case, even if such cases do begin to proliferate, courts
have a ready armamentarium of implements at their collective disposal that may be
used to fashion reasonable boundaries on liability and recovery.
